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Abstract
Many recommendation algorithms rely on user data to generate rec-
ommendations. However, these recommendations also affect the data ob-
tained from future users. This work aims to understand the effects of this
dynamic interaction. We propose a simple model where users with hetero-
geneous preferences arrive over time. Based on this model, we prove that
naive estimators, i.e. those which ignore this feedback loop, are not con-
sistent. We show that consistent estimators are efficient in the presence
of myopic agents. Our results are validated using extensive simulations.
1 Introduction
We find ourselves surrounded by recommendations that help us make better
decisions. However, relatively little work has been devoted to the understand-
ing of the dynamics of such systems caused by the interaction with users. This
work aims to understand the dynamics that arise when users combine the rec-
ommendations with their own preference when making a decision.
For example, a user of Netflix uses their recommendations to decide what
movie to watch. However, this user also has her own beliefs about movies,
e.g. based on artwork, synopsis, actors, recommendations by friends, etc. The
user thus combines the suggestions from Netflix with her own preferences to
decide what movie to watch. Netflix captures data on the outcome to improve
its recommendations to future users. Of course, this pattern is not unique to
Netflix, but observed more broadly; across all platforms that use recommenda-
tions.
A first requirement for any estimator is consistency; however it is not clear
that in the presence of human interaction naive estimators are consistent. In-
deed, we show that simple estimators can easily be fooled by the selection effect
of the users. We propose to measure performance by adapting the notion of
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regret from the multi-armed bandit literature. Using this metric, we show that
naive estimators suffer linear regret; even with ‘infinite data’ the performance
per time step is bounded away from the optimum.
Using the notion of regret is useful as it also allows us to quantify the ef-
ficiency of estimators. New users and items with little to no data constantly
arrive and thus a recommendation system is always in a state of learning. It
is therefore important that the system learn efficiently from data. While this
might sound like the well-known cold-start problem, that is not the focus of this
work; Rather than providing recommendation solutions for users in the absence
of data, we focus on quantifying how quickly an algorithm obtains enough data
to make good recommendations. This is more akin to the social learning and
incentivizing exploration literature than work on the cold-start problem.
1.1 Main results
From a technical standpoint, this paper provides a dynamical model that cap-
tures the dynamics of users with heterogeneous preferences, while abstracting
away the specifics of recommendation algorithms. In the first part of this work,
we show that there is a severe selection bias problem that leads to linear regret.
Second, we show that when the algorithm uses unbiased estimates for items,
‘free’ exploration occurs and we recover the familiar logarithmic regret bound.
This is important because inducing agents to explore is difficult from both a
statistical and strategic point of view. We validate our claims using simulations
with feature-based and low-rank methods.
It is important to note that the focus of this work is to provide a simplified
framework that allows us to reason about the dynamic aspects of recommenda-
tion systems. We do not claim that the model nor the assumptions are a perfect
reflection of reality. Instead, we believe that the model we propose provides an
excellent lens to better understand vital aspects of recommendation systems.
1.2 Related work
This work roughly intersects with three separate fields of study. Recommenda-
tion systems [Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005] have attracted much attention.
In particular, much research has focused on new methods that treat the data as
fixed, rather than dynamic. There has been less work on selection bias, which
was first demonstrated by Marlin [2003], and subsequent work [Amatriain et al.,
2009, Marlin et al., 2007, Steck, 2010]. Rather than modeling user behavior di-
rectly, they impose the statistical assumption of a covariance shift; the distribu-
tion of observed ratings is not altered by conditioning on the selection event, but
five star ratings are more likely to be observed. More recently, Schnabel et al.
[2016] and Joachims et al. [2017] link the bias from covariance shifts to recent
advances in causal inference. Mackey et al. [2010] combine matrix factorization
and latent factor models to capture heterogeneity in interactions and context.
The different approach of this work is reminiscent of the work on social
learning [Chamley, 2004, Smith and Sørensen, 2000], where agents learn about
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the state of the world by combining their private signals with observations of
actions (but not necessarily outcomes) of others. The work of Ifrach et al. [2014]
is closest related to our setup. They discuss how consumer reviews converge on
the quality of a product, given diversity of preferences under a reasonable price
assumption. However, the work in social learning focuses on users interacting
with a single item. This seemingly minor minor difference leads to completely
different dynamics.
Finally, we can relate our work on exploration to the multi-armed bandit
literature [Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012]. In particular, there has been prior
work on human interaction with multi-armed bandit algorithms: for example,
how a system can optimally induce myopic agents to explore [Kremer et al., 2013]
by using payments [Frazier et al., 2014] or by the way the system disseminates
information [Papanastasiou et al., 2014, Mansour et al., 2015, 2016]. Similar to
those works, we use the regret framework to analyse a system with interacting
agents. Because in our model agents have heterogeneous preferences, we show
that agents do not need to be incentivized to explore. Recent work by Bastani
et al. [2017], Qiang and Bayati [2016] consider natural exploration in contextual
bandit problems, and show that a modified greedy algorithm performs well.
While their motivation is different, the results are similar to ours. There has also
been work on ‘free exploration’ in auction environments [Hummel and McAfee,
2014].
1.3 Organization
In the next section, we introduce our model. In Sections 3 and 4 we focus on
the issues of consistency and efficiency, respectively. We illustrate our results
with simulations in Section 5 before concluding.
2 Modeling human-algorithm interaction
In this section, we propose a model for the interaction between the recommen-
dation system (platform) and users (agents). Each user selects one of the items
the platform recommends, and reports their experience to the platform by pro-
viding a rating as feedback. The platform uses this feedback to update the
recommendations for the next user.
More formally, we assume there are K items, labeled i = 1, . . . ,K, and
each item has a distinct, but unknown, quality Qi ∈ R. This aspect models
the vertical differentiation between items and it is the task of the platform to
estimate these qualities. For notational convenience, we assume Q1 > Q2 >
. . . > QK . At every time step t = 1, . . . , T a new user arrives and selects one
of the K items. To do so, the user receives a private preference signal θit ∼ Fi
for each item, drawn from a preference distribution Fi which we make precise
later. The value of item i for user t is
Vit = Qi + θit + εit (1)
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where εit is additional noise drawn independently from a noise distribution E
with mean 0 and finite variance σ2E < ∞. To aid the agents, the platform
provides a recommendation score sit, aggregating the feedback from previous
agents. The agent uses her own preferences, along with the score, to select item
at according to
at = arg max
i
sit + θit. (2)
Hence, we make the assumption that the agent is boundedly rational and uses
sit as a surrogate for the quality. Abusing notation, we write
Vt = Vatt = Qat + θatt + εatt (3)
for the value of the chosen item for agent t. After the agent selects item at and
observes the value Vt, the platform queries for feedback Wt from the user. For
example the platform can ask the user to provide the value of the item as a
rating, in which case Wt = Vt. Note that the private preferences θt of the agent
remain hidden. The platform uses this feedback to give recommendations to
future users. In particular, we require sit to be measurable with respect to past
feedback, that is σ{aτ ,Wτ : τ < t}.
We measure the performance of a recommendation system in terms of (pseudo-
)regret:
RT =
T∑
t=1
max
i
(Qi + θit)− (Qat + θatt), (4)
which sums the difference between the expected value of the best item and the
expected value of the selected item.1 We note that if scores sit ≡ Qi for all t,
the regret of such platform would be 0, as each user selects her optimal action
using equation (2).
2.1 Preferences, values and personalization
We use this section to expand on the motivation of the proposed model. The
value for item i at time t consists of three parts (see equation (1)). First, the
intrinsic quality Qi can be seen as the mean quality across users. In our theo-
retical analysis we treat this as a constant to be estimated such that we are able
to disentangle the model fitting from the dynamics of interaction. In this simple
setting, one should view it as a vertical differentiator between items. Taking
hotels as example, it could model quality of service and cleanliness, where a
common ranking across agents is sensible. The intrinsic qualities Qi can be
replaced by more complicated models, for example based on feature based re-
gression methods, or matrix factorization methods. Indeed, in Section 5.2.3 we
provide simulation results where we replace Qi with a low rank matrix factor-
ization model.
The second term in the value equation, θit, models horizontal differentiation
across agents. In our simplified model agents only arrive once, and thus this
1 Unlike the traditional bandit setting, there is no single best item. Rather, different users
might have different optimal items.
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also covers different contexts. For example, one traveler prefers a hotel on the
waterfront, while another prefers a hotel downtown, and yet a third prefers
staying close to the convention center. While these hypothetical hotels could
have the same quality, the value for users differs, in ways known to the user.
However, the intrinsic quality of these properties are unknown to these users.
All in all, the value of item i for agent t is drawn from a distribution with
mean Qi, and where the variance consists of a part that is known to the user
(θit) and a part that is unknown to both platform and user (εit). In section 5 we
investigate how well the theoretical results carry over to more general models.
One could argue that personalization methods (i.e. replacing Q with more
sophisticated models) supersede the need for idiosyncratic preferences θit, as
these preferences can be captured by those models. However, we argue that
in most cases this factor cannot be eliminated. Every recommendation system
is constrained in terms of the quantity and quality of the data it is based on.
First, a user only interacts with a system so often, and that limits the amount
of personalization that models can achieve. Second, recommendation systems
often have access to only weak features, and some aspects of user preferences
and contexts, such as taste or style, can be difficult to capture. Together, these
constraints make it difficult to fully model users preferences, hence the need to
explicitly model the unobserved preferences to get a deeper understanding of
the dynamics of recommendations systems.
2.2 Incentives
We note that the agents in our model are boundedly rational: their behavior is
not optimal, and in particular ignores the design of the platform. Experimen-
tally, there has been abundant evidence of human behavior that is not rational
[Camerer, 1998, Kahneman, 2003]. Simple heuristics of user behavior have been
used by others in the social learning community. Examples include learning
about technologies from word-of-mouth interactions [Ellison and Fudenberg,
1993, 1995] and modeling persuasion in social networks [Demarzo et al., 2003].
The combination of machine learning and mechanism design with boundedly
rational agents is explored by Liu et al. [2015].
The behavior of the user in our model implicitly relies on three assumptions:
1. The user is naive; she beliefs the scores supplied by the platform are
unbiased estimates of the true quality.
2. The user is myopic; she selects the item that seems best for her.
3. The user has incentives to give honest feedback.
The first assumption seems unrealistic if the platform abuses this power to
dictate exploration, which does not align with the myopic behavior. However,
in Section 4 we show that there is no need for such aggresive exploration from the
platform to obtain order-optimal performance. We also note that if the platform
outputs the true qualities Qi, then the selection rule (2) is optimal for a myopic
agent. Finally, it is not obvious why a myopic user would leave feedback. While
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we do not explicitly model returning users, we argue that in general a user is
motivated to leave feedback because it leads to better recommendations for her
in the future.
3 Consistency
In this section, we analyse the performance of standard algorithms, that is,
scoring processes that do not take into account that agents have private pref-
erences, and base the scores on empirical averages. This does include algo-
rithms that trade-off exploration and exploitation, such as variants of UCB
[Auer et al., 2002] and Thompson Sampling [Russo and Roy, 2016]. We focus
on the Bernoulli preferences model, though in Section 5 we empirically demon-
strate that different preference distributions lead to similar outcomes.
First we define the set of agents before time t that have selected item i by
Sit = {τ < t : aτ = i}. (5)
We also define V¯it to denote the empirical average of item i up to time t:
V¯it =
1
|Sit|
∑
τ∈Sit
Vτ (6)
where we use V¯it = 0 when Sit = ∅. We want to show that the system suffers
linear regret when the platform uses any scoring mechanism for which scores
converge to the empirical average of the observed values. This means that the
system never converges to an optimal policy; rather a constant fraction of users
are misled into perpetuity. To make this rigorous, we define the notion of mean-
converging scoring process.
Definition 1. A scoring process that outputs scores sit for item i at time t is
mean-converging if
1. sit is a function of {Vτ : τ ∈ Sit} and t.
2. sit → V¯it almost surely if lim inft |Sit|t > 0 almost surely.
In words, the score only depends on the observed outcomes for this particular
item, and if we observe a linear number of selections of arm i, then the score
converges to the mean outcome. Trivially, this includes using the average itself
as score, sit = V¯it, but this definition also includes well known methods that
carefully balance exploitation with exploration, such as versions of UCB and
Thompson Sampling.
From the previous section, we know that, ideally, the scores supplied to the
user converge to the quality of the item, sit → Qi, as more users select item i.
We say that the scores are biased if this is not the case:
sit 6→ Qi as |Sit| → ∞. (7)
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The next proposition shows that mean-converging scoring processes lead to lin-
ear regret, because these scores are generally biased. We only show this result
for when preferences are drawn from Bernoulli distributions as this simplifies
the analysis significantly. In Section 5 simulations show that linear regret is ob-
served under a variety of preference distributions. Under the Bernoulli model,
it is needed that the gap between qualities is ‘small’, though we show that this
condition is rather weak.
Proposition 1. When θit ∼ Bernoulli(p) for all i, t, if
∆ = Q1 −Q2 < (1− p)
K
(1− p)K + p (8)
and sit is mean-converging, then
lim sup
t→∞
Rt
t
≥ c (9)
for some c > 0.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the supplemental material.
The intuition behind the result is that the best ranked item is selected by users
that do not necessarily like it that much, while other items are only selected by
users who really love it. Therefore, the ratings of the best ranked item suffers
relative to others.
We note that for K = 100 and p = 1/50, the condition requires ∆ < 0.86.
More generally, in the relevant regime where p < log(K)2K , the condition is satisfied
if ∆ < 0.7 for all K. We also note that the linear regret we obtain is not caused
by the usual exploration/exploitation trade-off, but rather the estimators being
biased.
There is no bias result for general preference distributions as it is possible to
cherry pick distributions in such a way that biases cancel each other out exactly.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the problem depends crucially on the variance
in user preference relative to the differences in qualities.2 However, in Section 5
we provide simulations with a variety of preference distributions that suggest
that bias is not an artifact of our assumptions.
3.1 Unbiased estimates
Naturally, a first attempt to improve the linear regret is aimed at obtaining
unbiased versions of the naive averaging. We now sketch a few such approaches.
3.1.1 Randomization
Researchers can avoid selection bias in experimental studies by randomizing
treatments, and we can employ the same approach here. Instead of the user
2 In the limiting scenario of no variance in preferences, we already know that there is no
bias either.
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choosing an action, the platform assigns matches between users and items. Note
that pure randomization is not needed, user ratings are unbiased as long as the
selection of items is independent from private preferences.
Just like randomized control studies, this approach is often infeasible or
prohibitively expensive, e.g. a platform cannot force the user to select a certain
hotel or restaurant. However, small scale user experimentation can potentially
inform the platform on the magnitude and effects of idiosyncratic preferences
and the bias it induces.
3.1.2 Algorithmic approach
Another option is to consider algorithmic approaches to obtain consistent esti-
mators. In the case of Bernoulli preferences, it is possible to obtain unbiased
estimates from data. However, this approach does not generalize to other pref-
erence distributions, let alone to the case where we do not know the underlying
preference distributions.
3.1.3 Changing the feedback model
Given the difficulty of debiasing feedback algorithmically, we briefly discuss
a third alternative. The traditional type of question ‘How would you rate this
item?’ asks for an absolute measure of satisfaction, which corresponds to directly
probing for Vt in our model. If we ask how the chosen item compares to the
expectation, we ask for a relative measure of feedback, approximating Vt −
(satt+θatt). An example of such prompt could be ‘How does this item compare
to your expectation?’ This way, we can uncover an unbiased estimate of Qat .
Importantly, it does not require any distributional assumptions on the form of
the preferences. Whether such relative feedback works in practice would require
a thorough empirical study, which is beyond the scope of this work. We also
note that this approach does not work when platforms collect implicit feedback.
4 Efficiency
From the previous section we know that naive scoring mechanisms are incon-
sistent and lead to linear regret. We now focus on the efficiency of consistent
estimators, and we assume we have access to unbiased feedback from now on.
But, this is not necessarily sufficient to guarantee good performance. The multi-
armed bandit literature suggests that algorithms with small regret require a
careful balance between exploration and exploitation.
In particular, that means that the system needs to obtain data on every
item in order to provide useful scores to the users. However, myopic agents
have no interest in assisting the platform with exploration. In this section we
address the problem of exploration in the proposed model. As opposed to the
research mentioned in the introduction, we deal with agents with heterogeneous
preferences. It seems natural that these heterogeneous agents help the system
explore, but it is not obvious to what extent this helps. We show that because of
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this diversity in preferences, the free exploration leads to optimal performance
(up to constants); we recover the standard logarithmic regret bound from the
bandit literature. This means that there is little need for a platform to imple-
ment a complicated exploration strategy, and incentives naturally align much
better than in the settings of previous work.
4.1 Formal result
We assume the qualities Qi are bounded, and without loss of generality we can
assume they are bounded in [0, 1], and we assume access to unbiased feedback
from the user. That is, the feedback at time t for chosen item it is V˜t =
Qit +εt. However, we no longer require that private preference distributions are
Bernoulli. Let V¯it denote the average of the values observed of item i by time t
V¯it =
1
|Sit|
∑
τ∈Sit
V˜τ (10)
where Sit = {τ < t : aτ = i}. We now consider the scoring algorithm that clips
the value onto [0, 1]: sit = max(0,min(1, Vit)).
Then, if the private preferences have sufficiently large variance, made precise
in the theorem statement, then exploration is guaranteed and the platform
suffers logarithmic regret. Let ∆min be the smallest gap in qualities ∆min =
mini,j |Qi −Qj |.
The following result shows that empirical averaging is enough to get an order
optimal (pseudo)-regret bound with respect to the total number of agents T .
Proposition 2. If for all i, Fi are such that P(θit > 1) > γ′ and P(θit ≤ 0) ≥ γ
Then
E[regret(T )] ≤
(
16σ2
∆min
+ ∆min
)
K
+
32ασ2K(log(T )− log(∆min) + log(2))
∆2minC
(11)
where C = γ′γK−1.
The proof can be found in the supplement. The main idea is that we can
show every arm is chosen sufficiently often initially, and then concentration
inequalities ensure good performance after an initial learning phase.
Corollary 3. Suppose Fi is a symmetric distribution around 0 such that P(θit >
1) > γ, then the theorem applies with C ≥ γ21−K .
Also note that the theorem applies for Bernoulli preferences, where C =
p(1−p)K−1. The small value of C leads to a large leading constant. Simulations
suggest that performance is much better in practice.
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4.2 Remarks
The main take-away from this result is not so much the specific bound, but
rather the practical insight that it, and its proof, yield. The intuition is that
initially estimates of quality are poor. Therefore, it takes some time and luck for
users with idiosyncratic preferences to try these items. As estimates improve,
however, most agents are drawn to their optimal choice. Since these choices
differ across agents, the platform gets to learn efficiently about all items without
incurring a regret penalty.
The practical consequence of this observation is that to improve the perfor-
mance, the designer of a recommendation system should focus on simple ways
to make new items, or more generally items with few observations, more likely
to be chosen. We can achieve this by highlighting new arrivals. A good example
is Netflix, which clearly displays a ‘Recently Added’ selection.
5 Simulations
In this section we empirically demonstrate that the theoretical results derived
in the previous sections hold much more broadly. First, we focus on verifying
the results from our simplified model. Thereafter, we consider more advanced
personalization models using feature-based and low rank methods, where we
investigate the dynamics with private preferences.3
5.1 Simulations of regret
Before considering more advanced methods, we simulate our model using differ-
ent preference distributions and plot the cumulative regret over time. We run
50 simulations with 5000 time steps and K = 50 items across four preference
distributions with randomly drawn parameters. We then compare biased and
unbiased algorithms based on empirical averages. Figure 1 shows the cumula-
tive regret paths for each of these simulations. The qualities were drawn from
the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For the preference distributions Fi for item
i, we used
• Bernoulli distribution with pi ∼ U [0, 2 log(K)3K ].
• Normal distribution with µi = 0 and σi ∼ U [0, 1].
• Exponential distribution with scale λ−1i ∼ U [0, 1].
• Pareto distribution with shape αi ∼ U [2, 4].
These are chosen such that the variance in preference and qualities is roughly
similar. A clear pattern emerges; In all cases, the (biased) empirical averages
lead to linear regret, not just for the Bernoulli model covered by Proposition 1.
Second, we note the unbiased scores lead to much better results regardless of
the preference distribution, in line with Proposition 2.
3 The code to replicate the simulations is publicly available at https://github.com/
schmit/human_interaction.
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Figure 1: These plots shows the cumulative regret plotted against time for
both the naive empirical averages in blue, and the unbiased averages in orange.
5.2 Personalization methods
We now focus on methods that provide more personalized recommendations.
Because estimating such models is more complicated and computationally in-
tensive, we simplify the dynamics of our simulations to a two-staged approach.
We then use this approach to experiment with a feature-based and a low-rank
approximation approach to personalization based on synthetically generated
data.
5.2.1 Two-staged simulations
In our original setup, the platform updates its scoring rule after every observa-
tion. This is impractical when dealing with more sophisticated models. Instead
we first collect a set of observations using a fixed scoring algorithm (a train-
ing set), and fit the scoring algorithm once to this training data. We then use
this trained algorithm to generate a new set of observations (a test set), again
without updating the algorithm in between observations. The test set is used
to measure the performance of the fitted algorithm. Instead of using regret, we
measure performance by directly computing the average rating on the second
dataset generated by our trained algorithm. Note that it is possible to iterate
generating data and fitting models multiple times before generating a test set.
5.2.2 Ridge regression
In this section we discuss a feature-based model of personalization where the
rating is assumed to be a linear function of observed covariates.
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The model In the feature-based setting, each item has an unknown param-
eter vector wi and each user-item pair has an observed feature vector xit. The
value of item i for user t then becomes
Vit = Qi + x
T
itwi + θit + εit. (12)
Furthermore, we also parametrize θit in terms of xit, such that
θit ∼ N (xTitw˜, σθ) (13)
where w˜ is another unknown parameter vector. After generating the training
set using a fixed scoring rule, we use ridge regression to regress the reported
ratings for each item, which leads to estimates Qˆi and wˆi for each item. These
are then used as scoring rule: sit = Qˆi + x
T
itwˆi.
Simulation details There are n = 100 items, and wi ∈ Rp where p = 20.
We generate Qi ∼ N (0, 1) and wij , w˜ij ∼ N (0, 1/√p) independently. The
elements of the feature vectors are generated independently following xijt ∼
N (0, 1). The error term is drawn according to εit ∼ N (0, 1), and we set σθ = 0.1.
We generate 10np = 20000 observations.
The training sets are generated using four different scoring rules:
1. Using the oracle scoring rule: sit = Qi + x
T
itwi, which leads to perfect
recommendations.
2. Using the oracle scoring rule and unbiased ratings Vit − θit.
3. Using randomly selected items, hence the user has no choice.
4. We iterate steps one and two twice, where we first use randomly selected
items, then fit a Ridge regression to estimate the parameters, and use
these to generate the test set: sit = Qˆi + xˆ
T
itwi.
This last training set allows us to better understand how the system evolves
over time.
Results The average values of the selected items in the test set are plotted
in the left plot of Figure 2. The two dotted lines provide useful benchmarks: the
top line shows the performance of the oracle scoring rule, which upper bounds
the performance. The bottom line shows the performance in the absence of a
scoring rule, that is sit = 0 for all i, t. Finally, note that random selections lead
to an average rating of 0.
We note that the best performing recommendations are given by the model
trained on random data (green); these are close to the performance of the oracle.
Unbiased ratings based on the oracle (orange) perform a bit worse due to a
feedback loop. The model is only trained on ‘good’ selections and this leads to
a degradation of performance. We also see that the iterated model (red) that
was initially trained on random selections performs worse than the randomly
generated data, suggesting that the quality deteriorates over time. Finally, the
model trained on oracle data (blue) performs much worse than all the models,
and does not perform much better than the ‘no-score algorithm’ that does not
provide recommendations.
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Figure 2: We compare performances of recommendation systems based on dif-
ferent training data in a feature-based model on the left and matrix factorization
on the right. Green corresponds to random selections in the training set, orange
to oracle selections with unbiased feedback, red to the iterated model initially
based on random selections, and blue is based on biased oracle ratings.
5.2.3 Matrix factorization
In this section we investigate the dynamics of private preferences that are low
rank. We use the same two-stage approach as before, where we first use a fixed
scoring rule to generate a training set, fit our model, and use the fitted scoring
rule to generate a test set to measure performance.
The model The low-rank models assumes that the value for item i by user
j follows the model
vij = ai + bj + u
T
i vj + x
T
i yj + εit (14)
where ui and vj are (hidden) q-dimensional vectors modeling interaction be-
tween user and item, and ai and bj are terms modeling overall differences be-
tween users and items. Similarly, xi and yj are q-dimensional vectors that com-
bine the private preference θit = x
T
j yj . Note that, unlike in previous settings,
here we observe the same user multiple times. The recommendation system
provides score sij for user i and item j and the user selects item
arg max
j
sij + x
T
i yj (15)
and reports her value Vij . We use alternating least squares [Koren et al., 2009]
to estimate a, b, u and v.4
Simulation details As in the feature-based simulation, we generate four
training sets, one based on an oracle, one based on an oracle with unbiased
4 We ensure that users do not rate the same item in both the training and test set.
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ratings, one based on random selections, and finally an iterated version of the
random selections process, where we fit a model to the random selections data
and use that model to generate training data.
We simulate 2000 users and 500 items, with rank q = 4. Entries of u, v, x
and y are independent Gaussians with variance 1/q. To reduce variance, the
error term has a small variance, εij ∼ N(0, 0.01) and for both training and test
sets each user rates 40 items. We run alternating least squares with rank 2q
and varying regularization.
Results The two dotted lines denote the same benchmarks as before. Again,
we notice that recommendations trained on random data perform best, but this
time the difference is much more pronounced. The recommendations based on
perfect recommendations (blue and orange) perform a lot worse. In fact, they
do barely better than not recommending items at all and having users base
their choice solely on their own preference signals. Part of the degradation in
performance seems to be caused by a feedback loop; the observations are not
randomly sampled. We also notice a much stronger degradation in performance
of the iterated model (red). This suggests that the dynamic nature of recom-
mendation systems affect matrix factorization methods more severely than the
simpler linear model from the previous section.
6 Discussion
In this work, we introduce a model for analyzing feedback in recommendation
systems. We propose a simple model that explicitly looks at heterogeneous
preferences among users of a recommendation system, and takes the dynamics
of learning into account. We then consider the consistency and efficiency of
natural estimators in this model. Recent work has focused on exploration, or
efficiency, with selfish agents. On the one hand, preferences lead to inconsistent
estimators if this aspect is not taken into account. On the other hand, we also
show that there is an upside to heterogeneous preferences; they automatically
lead to efficiency. Using simulations, we demonstrate that these phenomena per-
sist when we use more sophisticated recommendation methods, such as matrix
factorization.
6.1 Future work
There are several directions of further research. Our simplified model does not
capture all aspects of recommendation systems. The most interesting aspect is
that, in practice, users only observe a limited set of recommendations, rather
than the entire inventory. This can lead to an inefficiency in the rate of explo-
ration, and requires further study.
Our model and simulations show that consistency of models is an issue that
is difficult to resolve. We believe that progress can be made. Theoretically, one
possible avenue is to also model the selection process directly and combine it
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with the model for outcomes. Empirically, by large scale studies that test the
effects of human interaction on estimators.
6.2 The bigger picture
We believe that this work has raised fundamental and important issues relating
the interaction between machine learning systems and the users interacting with
them. Algorithms not only consume data, but in their interaction with users
also create data, a much more opaque process but equally vital in designing
systems that achieve the goals we set out to achieve. There is still a lot of room
for improvement by gaining a better understanding of these dynamics.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the result by showing that the best item can-
not always be ranked at the top, because that would depress its score sit suffi-
ciently much that it cannot be at the top.
Fix a sample path ω ∈ Ω. Note that by assumption, each arm is optimal for
a constant fraction of agents. Define
xit =
|{τ : aτ = i}|
t
. (16)
Then, if lim inft xit < x
∗
i for some sufficiently small x
∗
i > 0, we incur linear regret
almost surely. Instead, assume that each arm is sampled a constant fraction,
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lim inft xit > δi for some δi for each arm i. We note that the expected reward
for the item ranked highest is
Qi +
p
p+ (1− p)K = Q+ ρ, (17)
where we define ρ = p
p+(1−p)K : With probability p this item is chosen because
of a positive signal, and with probability (1− p)K it is chosen because none of
the items have a positive signal. For the other items, the expected reward is
Qi + 1.
To understand limiting behavior of the item scores, it is thus important to
understand how often an item is ranked first by the platform. Define ct as the
fraction (up to time t) that the first (best) item is not ranked at the top:
ct =
|{τ < t : ∃j > 1 : s1τ < sjτ}|
t
. (18)
We note that if lim supt ct > c
∗ for some c∗ > 0, then the regret is linear.
Informally, we proceed by bounding P(item is ranked first | item is selected),
and use that to understand the evolution of the averages of ratings the platform
observes. To bound the above probability, we note that there are two extremes
when the item is not ranked first; it is ranked second, or ranked last. If it is
always ranked second when the item is not ranked first, it is less likely the item
was ranked first given selection than when it is either ranked first or last. If,
overall, the item is ranked first with fraction y, then we obtain
λ(y) ≤ P(item ranked first | item selected) ≤ λ′(y) (19)
where
λ(y) =
y(p+ (1− p)K)
y(p+ (1− p)K) + (1− y)p(1− p) , (20)
and
λ′(y) =
y(p+ (1− p)K)
y(p+ (1− p)K) + (1− y)p(1− p)K−1 (21)
correspond to the two extreme cases. Note that λ and λ′ are both decreasing.5
Now suppose lim sup ct = c. By the stong law of large numbers, the empirical
average converges to its mean and thus
lim sup
t
s1t ≤ Q1 + λ(1− c)ρ+ (1− λ(1− c)), (22)
where the second term corresponds to the expected reward from being ranked
first and the last term corresponds to the contribution from when the action is
not ranked first. Similarly
lim inf
t
s2t ≥ Q2 + λ′(c)ρ+ (1− λ′(c)), (23)
5 Both have the form
(1−x)a
(1−x)a+xb for a, b ∈ (0, 1)2, which has a negative derivative for
x ∈ (0, 1)
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almost surely by the mean-converging condition.
We note for c = 0, this leads to
lim sup
t
s1t ≤ Q1 + ρ and lim inf
t
s2t ≥ Q2 + 1 (24)
This is a contradiction if ∆ < (1−p)
K
p+(1−p)K , as this would imply the score of the
second arm is higher in the limit than that of the first arm, while the first item
is always ranked before the second item (c = 0):
lim sup
t
s1t = Q2 + ∆ + ρ (25)
< Q2 +
(1− p)K
p+ (1− p)K +
p
p+ (1− p)K (26)
≤ lim inf
t
s2t. (27)
Furthermore, since λ and λ′ are continuous and monotone, there must exist
some c∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Q1 + λ(1− c∗)ρ+ 1− λ(1− c∗) ≤
Q2 + λ
′(c∗) + 1− λ′(c∗) (28)
almost surely. Thus, if the first item is the top ranked item fracion 1 − c∗ of
the time, then its score is almost surely lower than the second item, which is
a contradiction. This implies that lim supt ct > c
∗ almost surely, which proves
that the regret is linear.
Proof Proposition 2. To bound the regret, we look at individual arms and note
that if at time t all scores sit are reasonably accurate, i.e. |sit − Qi| < λ for
all i, at such time the regret is at most 2λ. Furthermore, if λ < ∆min2 , then the
regret is 0 as each agent is compelled to pick the best item for them. Finally, it
is important to note that the regret at each period is at most 2.
We proceed as follows; we use concentration to bound the estimation error
when we have observed enough sample values. Furthermore, we show that due to
natural exploration, we have a high probability guarantee of observing samples
for each item. When combined, they lead to a logarithmic regret bound.
To use a concentration bound on the estimation error, we define event
Am(i, λ) =
∃s ∈ {m, . . . , T} : 1s
∣∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
j=1
εij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > λ
 . (29)
That is, Am(i, λ) is the bad event that after m pulls, there is some time t that
the score sit is off by more than λ.
Furthermore, we define events
Bm(i,M) = {|S| < m : τ ∈ S ⇐⇒ aτ = i and τ < M} (30)
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that indicate whether within M time steps, at least m users reported values for
item i.
Using these two events, we can bound the expected regret by
E[regret(T )] ≤
K∑
i=1
2(P(Am(i, λ)) + P(Bm(i,M)))T
+ 2M + λT I
λ>
∆min
2
(31)
Bounding Am Using the standard σ-sub-Gaussian concentration bound
(see, for example, Wainwright [2015, Chapter 2]), we have
P(Am(i, λ)) ≤ P
(
∃s ∈ {m, . . . , t} : 1
s
∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
i=1
εi
∣∣∣∣∣ > λ
)
(32)
≤
t∑
s=m
P
(
1
s
∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
i=1
εi
∣∣∣∣∣ > λ
)
(33)
≤ 2
t∑
s=m
exp
(
− sλ
2
2σ2
)
(34)
≤ 2
∫ t+1
m
exp
(
− sλ
2
2σ2
)
ds (35)
≤ 4σ
2
λ2
exp
(
−mλ
2
2σ2
)
(36)
Now set
m =
2σ2(log(T )− log(λ))
λ2
, (37)
and obtain
P(Am(i, λ)) ≤ 4σ
2
λ2
exp
(
−mλ
2
2σ2
)
=
4σ2
λT
(38)
Bounding Bm From the above, we know that the estimation error concen-
trates well after observing m selections. Now we show that with high probability,
it does not take too long to wait for m selections.
First note that the probability of selection of any item at any time t is at
least 21−Kγ. This follows from the conditions imposed on Fi. For M > m,
we note that the probability that we have not observed m selections is lower
bounded by a Binomial random variable Z ∼ B(M, 21−Kγ) since preferences
are independent between agents. Consider
M =
2αm
21−Kγ
=
4ασ2(log(T )− log(λ))
λ221−Kγ
(39)
where α = max
(
1, 2λ2/σ2
)
.
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First we note that in this case, E(Z) = 2αm ≥ 2m and thus
P(Bm) ≤ P
(
Z ≤ 1
2
E(Z)
)
(40)
≤ exp
(
−E(Z)
8
)
(41)
≤ exp
(
−ασ
2(log(T )− log(λ))
2λ2
)
(42)
≤ λ
T
(43)
where third inequality is a standard Chernoff bound and the second to last step
follows from the condition on α.
Plugging these bounds on Am(i, λ) and Bm(i,M) in to our bound for regret
(31), we obtain
E[regret(T )] ≤ 2
(
4σ2
λ
+ λ
)
K
+
8ασ2K(log(T )− log(λ))
λ221−Kγ
+ λKT I
λ>
∆min
2
(44)
and thus if we set λ = ∆min2 , we find
E[regret(T )] ≤
(
16σ2
∆min
+ ∆min
)
K
+
32ασ2K(log(T )− log(∆min) + log(2))
∆2min2
1−Kγ
(45)
as desired.
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